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PREFAcE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared 
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of 
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24 was 
established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating 
strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international 
financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within 
the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries. 
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Division on Globalization 
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in 
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial 
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce 
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional 
reform. 
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings 
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers 
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of 
the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) 
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums. 
 
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support 
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from 
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24. ENhANcING ThE ROlE OF REGIONAl 
DEvElOPMENT BANkS
Stephany Griffith-Jones
with David Griffith-Jones and Dagmar Hertova
Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex
G-24 Discussion Paper No. 50
July 2008vii Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks 
Abstract
Access by emerging market countries to private capital markets can be unreliable, limited and costly, 
and thus lending through multilateral development banks (MDBs) needs to continue playing an 
important role in the international development architecture. At the same time there are a number 
of important reasons why lending by regional and sub-regional development banks (RDBs, SRDBs) 
can and should play an important and valuable complementary role to multilateral lending and 
institutions.
The main issues and conclusions discussed in our paper are the following. Firstly we analyse 
the successful experiences of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF). European integration offers very valuable precedents and lessons; the EIB was 
central to the process of European integration since the beginning, as it was especially created to 
support this process. An interesting question is whether EIB lending to developing countries could 
not be expanded more. The CAF on the other hand is unique in being almost exclusively owned by 
developing countries. A noteworthy feature is also the exponential growth of its loans since 2000 
and the great average speed at which their loans are approved, with an average period of around 
3–4 months. These, and other positive features of the CAF provide very good lessons for potential 
new development banks. 
Next, we concentrate on the specific issue of infrastructure financing gaps. Recent estimates of the 
infrastructure financing gap in the Asia and Pacific region calculate a minimum of $180 billion every 
year. For the Latin America region to reach infrastructure coverage levels similar to that of China 
or the Republic of Korea, an annual spending of 4 per cent to 6 per cent of GDP would be required 
for the next 20 years, which means almost tripling the current spending. Furthermore, infrastructure 
challenges in Africa are massive. Within these financing gaps there is a large demand and need for 
regional initiatives to take place. Section III. Further highlights other sectors, such as social and 
productive sectors and preventing climate change that also require large investments. 
In section IV we analyse the limitations and market imperfections that face private finance. The 
volatility and reversibility of private capital flows, information asymmetries, as well as other market 
failures and problems with provision of regional public goods imply that RDBs and SRDBs need to 
play an important role in providing counter-cyclical finance when private flows dry up, helping to 
develop innovative market instruments that better share risks and providing regional public goods, 
where RDBs have a central role to play. Section V. further discusses the best available modalities for 
financing, such as local currency loans, guarantees and innovative instruments such as GDP-linked 
bonds. The moment is now particularly favourable for these instruments. Though current financial 
turbulence may pose a problem, investor appetite for emerging countries’ risk is still fairly strong. Such 
instruments would be especially valuable, if there was a sharp slowdown in the world economy.
 
Section VI describes the conditions for a new RDB or SRDB. Such a bank needs to be as strong 
financially as possible, by endowing it with a large capital base. It should be stressed that the perceived 
reputation and creditworthiness of such an institution may take some time to become established. Here 
the example of the success of the CAF and the quick expansion of its lending serves as a great example. 
Based on some preliminary calculations that we have conducted in this paper, we estimate that if 
developing countries were to allocate just 1 per cent of their reserves to paid-in capital for expansion 
or creation of developing country RDBs, the expanded RDBs or new ones could provide an additional 
annual lending of approximately $77 billion! This would be very significantly higher (and more than 
double) than that of lending by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the 
Asian Development Bank (AsDB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) put together!viii G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 50
We conclude that there is a need for new or expanded regional development banks to fill gaps in the 
international financial architecture. Regional development banks have specific and localized roles 
which are not always covered adequately by global institutions. In the case of Asia, there is a clear 
lack of sub-regional development banks, with the AsDB being the only – if major, effective and well 
established – regional bank. Because of the diversity of Asian countries and, especially, the huge 
distances between different regions and countries, it may be desirable to create several SRDBs, for 
example, a South Asian, North East Asian and South East Asian SRDB. In the case of Latin America, 
there already exists an important network of SRDBs, which are major lenders to countries in their 
sub-regions and therefore there seems to be a strong case to expand existing institutions. Furthermore, 
the creation of the Banco Sur, can provide valuable additional resources to meet the region’s needs, 
especially where gaps exist.
The world economy has changed in recent years and now very large pools of savings and foreign 
exchange reserves originate in developing countries. Creating new institutions or expanding existing 
ones – if developing countries are the only or main members – will have very clear benefits; the most 
important one is increasing their voice in the allocation of resources, especially those that originate 
from their own national savings and their own very large foreign exchange reserves. This is an 
important and unique opportunity that developing countries need to take now!ix Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks 
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Clearly lending through multilateral develop-
ment banks (MDBs) needs to continue playing an 
important role in the international development 
architecture. Amongst its important functions are: 
(1) providing concessional loans to low income 
countries (2) provide long-term financing to middle-
income, especially small countries, who due to lack 
of credit worthiness or high fixed costs involved, do 
not have adequate access to private funds, (3) act as 
a counter-cyclical offset to fluctuations in private 
capital market financing for middle-income countries. 
This is crucial because as Gurria and Volcker (2001) 
point out and as history has repeatedly shown, ac-
cess by emerging market countries to private capital 
markets can be “unreliable, limited and costly”, and 
(4) facilitate – by acting as market maker or guaran-
tor – the creation of new, more development friendly, 
forms of development financing (Griffith-Jones and 
Ocampo 2002).
A.  Strengths of regional and sub-regional 
banks
However there are a number of important 
reasons why lending by regional or sub-regional 
banks can and should play an important and valu-
able complementary role to multilateral lending and 
institutions. The Monterrey Consensus nicely sum-
marized several of the main roles that strengthened 
regional and sub-regional development banks need 
to play: “add flexible support to national and regional 
development efforts, enhancing ownership and over-
all efficiency. They also serve as a vital source of 
knowledge and expertise on growth and development 
for their developing member countries”.
More specifically, regional and sub-regional 
development banks;
  (i)  Allow a far greater (or even in some cases, prac-
tically an exclusive) voice to developing country 
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borrowers, as well as a greater sense of regional 
ownership and control. This is particularly the 
case for institutions like the Corporacion Andina 
de Fomento (CAF1), where countries are both 
clients and shareholders.
 (ii)  Regional and sub-regional development banks 
are more able to rely on informal peer pressure 
rather than imposing conditionality. This fur-
ther allows disbursements of resources in a far 
more timely and flexible manner. The special 
relationship between regional or sub-regional 
development banks and member countries 
encourage countries, even in difficult times 
to continue servicing their debt to their bank 
helping give it strong preferred-creditor status. 
This can reduce the risk for the institution, and 
thus enhance its credit rating well above that 
of its member countries. (We will illustrate 
these points below with the experience of the 
CAF whose member countries have contin-
ued servicing their debt to it, even when they 
stopped paying other creditors, due to serious 
macroeconomic difficulties). 
  (iii)  Regional or sub-regional development banks 
are particularly valuable for small and medium 
sized countries, unable to carry much influence 
in global institutions, and with very limited 
power to negotiate with large global institutions. 
Their voice can be far better heard and their 
needs better met by regional or sub-regional 
development banks. Furthermore, competition 
between two or more kinds of organizations, 
e.g. sub-regional, regional and global, for the 
provision of development bank services seems 
to be the best modality, as it provides small 
and medium sized countries with alternatives 
to finance development (Ocampo 2006).
 (iv)  MDBs are owned by their government share-
holders and need to respond to their political and 
economic agendas. Shareholder perceptions are 
influenced by a variety of domestic constituen-
cies, especially in developed member countries, 
where many groups can exert pressure on their 
representatives or senior management. Indeed, 
by having to accommodate a growing variety 
of different and sometimes conflicting interests, 
e.g. those of NGOs and private sector interests, 
MDBs can find it difficult to find common 
ground between these groups and borrower 
governments. In contrast, in regional and sub-
regional banks, relations between shareholders 
and their constituencies tend to be simpler, es-
pecially those owned entirely or almost entirely 
by borrowing countries, which is the case of the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the CAF. 
The fact that all shareholders of these banks are 
also its clients has positive effects. For exam-
ple, it reduces complexity of negotiations and 
reduces loan conditions, especially for smaller 
countries.
 (v)  Indeed, even in institutions like the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) – though 
borrowers have just over 50 per cent of the vote 
and choose the President – the non-borrowing 
counties tend to have a fairly dominant position 
(Sagasti and Prada 2006; Strand 2003). In the 
case of the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), 
borrowing countries have even a lower share 
of voting power, reaching under 43 per cent; 
however, there are two large dominant non-
borrowing countries, the United States and 
Japan, each with 12.5 per cent of the vote. 
 (vi)  Information asymmetries may be far smaller 
at the regional level, given proximity as well 
as close economic and other links. Regional 
institutions may better share the experience 
of institutional development. Indeed, regional 
development banks’ ability to transmit and use 
region specific knowledge can make them par-
ticularly helpful to countries designing policies 
most appropriate to their economic needs and 
political constraints (Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez, 
2004). However knowledge on extra-regional 
experiences can be more difficult to acquire than 
from a global institution.
  (vii) Regional institutions may be better placed to 
respond to regional needs and demands, as 
well as potentially be more effective in pro-
viding regional public goods, especially those 
requiring large initial investments and regional 
coordination mechanisms. Important exam-
ples are: (a) financing regional cross-border 
infrastructure (where experience of the Euro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB), provides a very 
valuable precedent, see below) (b) supporting 
development of regional capital markets as well 
as harmonizing their regulatory systems, and 
(c) coordinating and helping finance regional 
efforts, at technological innovation. However, 
as discussed below, RDBs and SRDBs support 3 Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks
for regional projects has been insufficient, and 
well below their potential, except for the EIB. 
Nevertheless, it is encouraging that there is in-
creasing attention from some RDBs and SRDBs 
to supporting finance of regional infrastructure, 
e.g. for the Integration of Regional Infrastruc-
ture in South America. In contrast, multilateral 
institutions, like the World Bank, may be more 
suitable for financing global public goods, such 
as financing investment in technology for reduc-
ing climate change.
It is therefore clear that RDBs and SRDBs need 
to play a very important complementary role in the 
existing international development finance architec-
ture, by helping to fill gaps that currently exist, and 
providing competition in sources of public finance. 
Indeed, as Sagasti and Prada (2006) argue regional 
institutions can play “specific and localized roles 
which are not always covered adequately by global 
institutions”. These institutions can play such a role 
giving a dominant or exclusive voice to their devel-
oping country members 
B.  MDBs also have some advantages
As we have also started to mention, multilateral 
or regional development banks do have certain ad-
vantages over sub-regional development banks with 
only or mainly developing country members. The first 
is cost. Indeed, even though the CAF has achieved a 
very good credit rating – investment grade – (which 
is well above that granted to its developing country 
members, none of which have investment grade rat-
ing), the spread it charged over LIBOR for its credits 
were in December 2006 double that of the World 
Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank (see 
below especially table 3). This is because the World 
Bank and the IADB have AAA rating. However, it 
should be emphasized that the higher spread charged 
by the CAF than, for example, the World Bank is 
compensated for by the lower transaction costs and 
greater policy autonomy arising from informal peer 
pressure of the CAF replacing often intricate condi-
tionality of the World Bank or the IADB; furthermore 
CAF loans are approved on average very quickly. 
Another is the maturity of loans, for example the 
maturity of CAF loans is, on average, shorter than 
that of the World Bank or IADB loans, even though 
as discussed below, the maturity of CAF loans has 
been increasing, with some loans recently even hav-
ing 18–20 years maturity. 
A global institution such as the World Bank 
could also potentially better provide services linked 
to its global nature. As already hinted at, it could 
spread and transmit international knowledge on 
development best practice, as it has presence and 
detailed experience in most countries. It could be 
argued, however, that in several areas (such as the 
liberalization of the capital account) the lessons ac-
cumulated in one region (e.g. Latin America) were 
not effectively transmitted by institutions like the 
World Bank to other regions (e.g. Asia or Central 
and Eastern Europe). Indeed, it could be argued that 
RDBs or SRDBs in practice may, in some instances, 
be better at adapting international experience for 
their region, as they are closer to country members, 
as well as their needs. 
Another area where a global institution has 
greater potential advantages is in providing benefits 
of international diversification. This is clear in gen-
eral terms in the reduced risk of its loan portfolio, 
given its exposure to many developing countries in 
different regions. It would be particularly valuable 
if an institution like the World Bank combined in-
novative loans it made to a variety of countries (e.g. 
in domestic currency or GDP linked bonds) into a 
basket of such loans, which it could then securitize 
and sell to private financial markets. Clearly regional 
development banks could do a similar exercise of 
market-making, but by being more regional, the 
benefits of international diversification would be 
somewhat limited. 
C.  Expanding and creating new regional 
banks
It can be concluded that multilateral, regional 
and sub-regional banks all have specific strengths. 
Furthermore, given the heterogeneity of developing 
countries’ needs, the best arrangement is one where 
MDBs are increasingly complemented by a network 
of strong RDBs and SRDBs. RDBs and SRDBs have 
many important advantages for borrowing develop-
ing countries.
A final important point needs to be made relating 
to new circumstances which seem likely to persist. 
In the past, a key advantage of including developed 4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 50
country members in development banks was their 
ability to provide a large and growing pool of savings 
and foreign exchange that allowed increases in those 
banks’ capital and access to world financial markets. 
However the world economy has changed and now 
very large pools of savings and foreign exchange 
reserves originate in developing countries. This is, of 
course, particularly true in much of Asia; however, 
even in Latin America, many countries are accumu-
lating quite high levels of foreign exchange reserves, 
though domestic savings are much lower than in Asia. 
Therefore the potential for a significant expansion of 
regional or sub-regional development banks, with 
only or mainly developing country members has 
grown significantly as these countries could rely on 
their own resources for capital. We will provide initial 
calculations in section VII to show its feasibility. The 
considerable advantages of such institutions for their 
developing country members – as discussed above – 
would seem to show now is the time for expanding 
such institutions where they exist and are successful, 
as well as creating new ones where they do not exist 
at all and/or where there are unmet needs. 
In what follows, we will first elaborate on the 
need for expanding and creating new institutions 
(section II). We will first draw in more detail on 
the experiences of the EIB and CAF. We will then 
examine infrastructure financing gaps in Asia, Latin 
America and Africa, as an example of an area of 
major unmet needs where RDBs and SRDBs can 
play a valuable role. Section III discusses priorities 
for new RDBs or the expansion of existing ones. 
Section IV examines the extent to which private 
financial markets or existing development banks 
fund developmentally necessary projects. Section 
V analyzes briefly the best modalities (e.g. loans 
and guarantees) through which financing should be 
made available, to maximize its developmental im-
pact. Emphasis is placed on innovative instruments, 
such as local currency lending, GDP-linked bonds 
and innovative guarantees. Section VI discusses the 
structure of RDBs so they can reduce their cost of 
lending and increase poorer countries’ access. Section 
VII provides initial calculations of resources neces-
sary for significantly expanding developing country 
owned RDBs or creating new ones, on a scale that 
could contribute significantly to meet infrastructure 
finance and other development needs. Section VIII 
concludes by summarizing the need for new RDBs 
and SRDBs as well as expanding existing ones. The 
availability of large foreign exchange reserves make 
both feasible.
II.  The need for expanding regional 
institutions and creating new ones
A.  Broad needs: lessons from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB)
As outlined in the Introduction, RDBs and 
SRDBs have very valuable features for developing 
countries. These are particularly clear for provision of 
regional and public goods, which are currently heav-
ily under-financed. According to Birdsall (2006) there 
is very little financing of “regional public goods” in 
most of the institutions lending to developing econo-
mies, with one per cent or less of the total lending by 
the Asian Development Bank, African Development 
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank going 
to these initiatives; however some institutions, like 
the CAF, have increasingly begun to focus on lending 
for regional infrastructure (see, for example, CAF 
Annual Report, 2006).
The current process of global integration is 
also one of open regionalism. Regional trade and 
investment flows have deepened significantly, as a 
result both of policy and market-driven processes 
of regional integration (Ocampo 2006). Policy-led 
integration relates to the large scale of regional, 
sub-regional, and bilateral trade agreements that 
have built up in the last decade. Market–driven 
integration, especially in East Asia, was led by in-
vestment and trade in manufactures in increasingly 
integrated value chains. The growing importance of 
trade integration and regional trade flows makes the 
provision of complementary regional public goods 
– especially regional infrastructure – very neces-
sary. Given the important imperfections of private 
international capital markets, especially in the provi-
sion of long-term funding – such as is required for 
infrastructure – RDBs and SRDBs need to play an 
ever increasing role. 
In this aspect, European integration offers 
very valuable precedents and lessons. Naturally, 
the European integration had several somewhat 
unique factors. These include geographical proxim-
ity, an initial core of six founding members with 
a relatively similar degree of development. There 
was also a very strong political vision driving the 
European integration process: the wish was that war 
would never again take place in Europe, given the 
horrors of World War II. In the context of this study, 
it is important that since its beginning, European 5 Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks
integration has been accompanied by the creation 
of major financial mechanisms. Such mechanisms 
and the resulting financial transfers were seen as 
both an economic and political condition for mak-
ing economic integration effective and equitable. 
These mechanisms included loans (mainly through 
the European Investment Bank) and most recently 
guarantees (European Investment Fund), as well as 
grants through structural funds.2
These financial mechanisms had two major 
aims: (1) reducing income differentials within the Eu-
ropean Community (and later the European Union), 
between countries and regions, particularly those 
resulting from trade liberalization, and (2) allocating 
major financial resources to facilitate the functioning 
of an increasingly integrated market, for example, by 
financing inter connection of national networks in 
transport and telecommunications. Whilst other aims 
have later been added, such as financing health and 
education, these two have remained central.
It is important to stress that very large – and 
overall rapidly growing – resources have been al-
located in Europe consistently for these aims. To 
an important extent, this dynamic has been driven 
by the relatively poorer countries, which during the 
negotiations for their joining the Community have put 
as a pre-condition the creation, or sharp increase of, 
grants and loans. The first such case was when Italy 
– before joining the European Economic Community 
(EEC) – pressed in the mid 1950’s for the creation of 
the European Investment Bank, largely to help fund 
infrastructure in the poorer Southern Italy. Strong 
institutions, like the European Commission (EC) 
and the European Investment Bank, have contributed 
also to the sustained dynamic of financial transfers. 
They also contribute to providing the political and 
economic “glue” that pushes integration forward. 
Each regional integration process differs, but it 
seems clear that the broadly very successful Euro-
pean experience of financial mechanisms to support 
trade (and increasingly broader) integration has 
interesting and important lessons for other regional 
integration processes, particularly those involving 
developing countries. The central lesson from the 
EIB experience is the importance of a large and 
dynamic public regional bank to support integration 
and convergence. 
More specific lessons will be discussed in the 
following sections below. It seems interesting to 
highlight here that for more developing countries 
– especially less creditworthy ones – where market 
imperfections prevail more often, the role of regional 
public banks is probably more similar to the EIB in 
its early stages; their needs are focussing more on 
loans. However, mechanisms such as guarantees and 
other risk-bearing instruments where the EIB can of-
fer more recent lessons, will have increasing future 
relevance for developing countries. 
The EIB was central to the process of European 
integration since the beginning. Indeed, the 1957 
Treaty of Rome that created the European Economic 
Community also created the EIB. The EIB, the most 
powerful instrument in the Treaty, was established 
in order “to contribute to the balanced and smooth 
development of the Common Market in the interest 
of the Community” (Treaty of Rome, Article 130). 
The EIB was intended as a source of relatively cheap 
interest loans and guarantees which would facilitate 
the financing of: 
(a) projects for developing less developed 
regions; (b) projects for modernizing or con-
verting undertakings or for developing fresh 
activities called for by the progressive estab-
lishment of the common market; (c) projects 
of common interest to several member states, 
which are of such size or nature that they can-
not be entirely financed by the various means 
available in the individual member states” 
(Treaty of Rome, Article 130).
The EIB was therefore especially created as a 
Bank to support the European integration process. 
Its three objectives, outlined in the paragraph above, 
reflected three major concerns expressed during the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Rome. The first was to 
help reduce the gulf between relatively prosperous 
and relatively poorer regions. The second major 
concern was to help “senile industries”, and/or areas 
where such industries were dominant, which could 
not, on their own, face competition, but required 
support for modernization, conversion or develop-
ment of new activities. Given major changes in the 
world structure of production, especially linked to the 
emergence of China as a major source of demand, 
as well as competitor in many sectors, this type of 
financing to help new activities may be again very 
relevant for developing countries, either nationally 
or at a regional level. The third concern was for the 
need to finance investment which helped integrate the 
European economies, and which related to several 
member states or to the Community as a whole. This 6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 50
refers in particular to the area of cross frontier com-
munications (and especially transport), which was 
related to the fact that much of existing infrastructure 
at the time was geared to meeting domestic needs; the 
creation of the EEC led to new cross-border needs. 
It is noteworthy that these three aspects (possibly in 
somewhat different proportions) could also be cen-
tral as supportive measures to integration processes 
between developing countries.
To summarize, the common goal of economic 
success spread over the entire Community was de-
fined as a prime political objective. As currencies in 
the mid-fifties were still not fully convertible and 
capital markets were underdeveloped there was a 
strong case, both theoretically and politically, to deal 
with these market imperfections through the crea-
tion of a public bank. The main mission of the EIB 
was to assist in channelling savings from the more 
developed parts of the Community to the less devel-
oped parts. At the same time it was recognized that a 
customs union needed to complete and transform its 
essentially national infrastructure into an integrated 
European infrastructure and that was an essential part 
of European integration. 
A final point to be made here is the very large 
scale of EIB lending. Indeed by 2006 the EIB was 
lending around 50 billion euro annually, which means 
that it lent more than all other MDBs and RDBs 
together. However, EIB lending had a somewhat 
slow start. The latter seems to be linked to the need 
to build up operations slowly, gain experience, and 
focus on economically promising projects within a 
narrow range. As a new bank, the EIB had to first 
establish a solid reputation. The underdeveloped and 
divided European capital market put constraints on 
its refinancing capacities. However, lending by the 
EIB has increased extremely rapidly, as the EC was 
successively enlarged from the initial six members to 
the current twenty seven; furthermore, new sectors, 
such as health and education, were incorporated into 
its portfolio. There has been also a vast expansion of 
global loans – made to private banks – for on-lending 
to small and medium-seized enterprises (SMEs), as 
well as equity participation and portfolio guarantees. 
Thus, the EIB has evolved from a Bank lending in 
its first 10 years almost exclusively to infrastructure 
(48 per cent of the total) and industry (39 per cent of 
the total), to one where infrastructure plays a leading 
role (with 44 per cent of total loans in 1999–2003), 
but one in which there is a greater diversification of 
lending to other sectors – global loans (31 per cent), 
energy (9 per cent), industry (8 per cent) and health, 
education (5 per cent) (based on data from Griffith-
Jones et al., 2006).
It should be stressed that the EIB maintains 
its redistributive regional role, with an important 
part of its individual loans going to assist regions 
lagging behind in their economic development or 
grappling with structural difficulties. One of the 
success stories of large EIB loans and of significant 
European Community grants is in Ireland, where 
those resources, together with very effective policies, 
helped to transform this very poor country into one 
of the richest in the EU.
Additionally, the EIB has started lending out-
side EU borders. It therefore lends to the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), Latin 
American and Asian, as well as Mediterranean coun-
tries. This represents approximately 10 per cent of 
total EIB lending. An interesting question is whether 
such EIB lending to developing countries could not 
be expanded more, and whether the EIB could not 
work more closely with existing RDBs and SRDBs 
to help promote, or even co-finance, expansion of 
their lending for priority sectors. 
B.  Another successful experience: the CAF
Latin America and the Caribbean offer a good 
example of a well developed network of sub-regional 
financial institutions. Of particular interest for our 
analysis is the Corporacion Andina de Fomento 
(CAF), known in English as Andean Development 
Corporation. 
The CAF is unique in being almost exclusively 
owned by developing countries. Spain, who has now 
joined, is the only exception, having only 8.6 per cent 
of total capital; all the rest of the capital is owned 
by Latin American countries. Initially, the CAF was 
created to support sustainable development and inte-
gration of the Andean Community countries (Bolivia, 
Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). However, 
CAF membership has grown to include most Latin 
American and even some Caribbean countries, as 
well as – as already mentioned – Spain. 
A noteworthy feature of the CAF is the expo-
nential growth of its loans. Especially since 2000, 
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financing for the Andean countries, (over 55 per cent), 
thus surpassing lending to those countries by the 
IADB and World Bank combined (see table 1). 
As regards the distribution of the loans, we can 
see in table 2 that the CAF lends to a variety of activi-
ties. In 2006, over 50 per cent of its lending went to 
infrastructure, broadly defined, of which integration 
infrastructure represented over 22 per cent of the 
total. It is also interesting that over 7 per cent went 
to the productive sector, a proportion that has been 
higher in the past.
A very special feature of the CAF is the great 
average speed at which their loans are approved, 
with an average period of around 3–4 months. This 
is similar to the reported average period of approval 
for the EIB, which is also around 3–4 months. 
The speed of approval of loans is linked to 
the fact that formal conditionality does not exist in 
the CAF. The modality basically used is rigorous 
economic evaluation of projects. Then, matrices of 
agreed actions are designed; reportedly, not meeting 
these agreed actions does not stop disbursement of 
loans, but may trigger additional technical assist-
ance by the CAF to help these conditions being met. 
Another interesting feature is that in the matrix of 
agreed actions, there tends to be emphasis on those 
that can be implemented by a country’s Executive 
Branch or where it is easy to get Congressional ap-
proval. This policy is called by CAF officials one of 
“responsible pragmatism” (for more discussion of 
this, see below). 
A second feature of the CAF which helps accel-
erate approval of its loans is that, unlike the IADB or 
the World Bank, it has no permanent Board resident in 
CAF headquarters. As a result, loans – and technical 
assistance (up to fairly large limits) – are approved 
by senior management of the CAF, which increases 
agility of the approval process. 
The fact that loans are approved so quickly and 
conditions are so flexible seems to explain why An-
dean member countries have increasingly borrowed 
Table 1
lOANS TO ANDEAN cOUNTRIES 1995–2004 
(Millions of dollars)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
IADB and World Bank 2,133 1,924 1,392 2,996 2,558 2,152 1,917 1,559 4,124 2,329
CAF 2,258 2,314 2,900 2,673 2,182 2,323 3,198 3,290 3,304 3,503
Source:  Titelman, 2006.
Table 2
APPROvAlS By STRATEGIc SEcTOR
(Per cent)
Financial systems and capital markets 18.0




Social development infrastructure 15.2
Integration infrastructure 22.9
Source:  CAF.
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from the CAF, even though its loans are somewhat 
more expensive than those of the IADB and the World 
Bank (see table 3). 
As pointed out in the Introduction, the main 
reason why CAF resources are more expensive than 
those of the IADB or the World Bank is its somewhat 
lower rating, due to the fact that a very small propor-
tion of its capital is owned by a developed country 
member. 
However, the CAF does have investment grade, 
and it has a much higher rating than all its Latin 
American member countries, which is a very impor-
Table 3
cOMPARATIvE SOvEREIGN MDB lOAN chARGES 







loans IADB AfDB AsDB EBRD CAF
Interest Spread
Contractual spread 75 75 30 40 60b 100 -
Risk premium - 5 49c - - - -
Benefit of sub-LIBORd funding cost -35 -30 -29 - -31 - -
Waivers -25 -25 -15 - -20 - -
Net spread over LIBOR (I) 14 25 35 40 9 100 50
charges
Commitment charge 75 75 25 - 75e 50 -
Waiver -50 -50 -15 - - - -
Net commitment fee 25 25 10 - 75 50 -
Spread equivalent of commitment fee f (II) 17 17 7 0 29 35 25
Net front-end fee
Contractual front-end fee 100 100 0 0 100 100 -
Waiver 100 100 - - 100 -
Net front-end fee 0 0 0 0 0 100 -
Spread equivalent of front-end fee f (III) 0 0 0 0 0 21 15
Total spread-equivalent over lIBOR (I+II+III) 31 42 42 40 38 156 90
Source:  World Bank, 2006, available at: http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Financial=Products/Lending+Rates+and+Loan 
+Charges/index/html; for information about CAF, see http://www.caf.com/attach/11/default/SandPMayo2007.pdf.
a  Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
b  This is a variable spread.
c  Premium for risk mitigation net of risk mitigation benefit.
d  The IBRD cost margin (sub-LIBOR spread) shown for the variable spread loan is for rate settings from 15 July 2006 through 
14 January 2007. Sub-LIBOR spread for IADB is for 2006 Q4. Sub-LIBOR spread for AfDB is the current sub LIBOR.
e  The commitment charge is applicable to the following proportion of loan amount less the cumulative disbursements: 15 per 
cent in the first year, 45 per cent in the second year, 85 per cent in the third year and 100 per cent in the fourth year and 
beyond. 
f  (Not in the case of CAF) Spread-equivalent computations for commitment charge and front-end fee use average project 
disbursement profile of 8 years.  Repayment terms are used as follows: final maturity: 17 years; grace period: 5 years; level 
repayment of principal.  Disbursement profiles and payment terms vary across MDBs and hence spread equivalent. 9 Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks
tant achievement.3 In the terminology of economics, 
this is an important coordination gain. It is also im-
pressive that the CAF has a higher rating than any 
other Latin American issuer. 
As the rating agencies evaluating the CAF them-
selves point out (Fitch Ratings 2006), one of the key 
reasons for the CAF’s high rating (which allows it to 
lend at spreads below those that the Andean countries 
could borrow themselves) is the excellent repayment 
record on its loans giving it de-facto preferred credi-
tor status. Indeed between 1999 and 2003, some of 
which were difficult years for the Andean countries, 
the CAF had practically no delinquency in its loan 
portfolio. Indeed, when Ecuador faced a financial 
crisis in the late 1990s, it continued servicing its 
debt to the CAF, even though it was not doing so 
to other creditors; similarly when Mr. Alan Garcia, 
President of the Republic of Peru, during the 1980s 
debt crisis, limited debt service payments to 10 per 
cent of all creditors, the CAF debt continued to be 
serviced in full. 
Furthermore, Fitch Ratings, op. cit., emphasizes 
that “projects financed by the CAF tend to involve the 
provision of essential infrastructure, where demand 
has proved to be high. More speculative projects are 
not favoured. All projects must be viable on a stand 
alone basis.” Indeed these factors combined with its 
judicious management further explain the success 
and the high rating of the CAF. 
Finally the higher credit rating of the CAF than 
that of its member countries is also helped by the 
high ratio of paid-in to subscribe capital. This is an 
efficient use of countries’ reserves, as it allows the 
CAF to borrow at terms lower than their own. 
C.	 Infrastructure	financing	gaps
In 2003, the world’s infrastructure stock was 
about $15 trillion. Of this total, about 60 per cent 
was in high-income countries, 28 per cent in middle-
income countries and 13 per cent in low-income 
countries. In contrast, the population shares were 
16 per cent, 45 per cent, and 39 per cent respec-
tively. This is a first, very broad indicator for the 
under provision of infrastructure in middle income 
and, even more, in low income countries (Fay and 
Yepes, 2003).
Fay and Yepes (2003) empirically estimate the 
demand for infrastructure between 2000 and 2010 
based on expected income growth and structural 
change; the latter include rapid urbanization and 
environmental problems. Based on those estimates 
they calculate the expected annual new investment 
and maintenance expenditures to satisfy firm and 
consumer demand. 
For illustration and comparison between regions, 
table 4 shows the annual needs for new infrastructure 
investment and maintenance for the period 2005–
2010 by income group and region, using estimated 
annual world growth rate of 2.7 per cent of GDP.
Within developing countries themselves, there 
is substantial regional variation for total investment 
from a low of 3 per cent of GDP in Latin America to 
a high of 6.9 per cent in South Asia. 
1.  East Asia and Pacific
Estimated expenditure needs for the East Asia 
and Pacific region are approximately $170 billion 
annually between 2006 and 2010, or about 6.5 per 
cent of the region’s GDP. This would help East Asia 
and the Pacific to achieve their expected growth rates. 
China’s relative financing needs, estimated at over 
$132 billion annually for that period, are larger than 
the needs of all other developing countries in that 
region combined.
In South Asia there are also very large unmet 
needs in infrastructure; there is much consensus that 
extending access to infrastructure services will be 
critical to sustaining the region’s high growth, and 
ensuring its benefits are shared with the region’s 
large number of poor. If the above estimates for East 
Asia and the Pacific are combined with investment 
requirements for South Asia as given in Fay and 
Yepes (2003), the total infrastructure needs for the 
Asia and Pacific region for the period 2006–2010 are 
as shown in table 5 below.4
It is estimated that about $228 billion is needed 
by the whole of Asia and Pacific countries annually 
to meet infrastructure demand in the region (ADB/
JBIC/WB, 2005). This is likely to be the lower bound 
estimate and therefore $228 billion is likely to sig-
nificantly underestimate the region’s infrastructure 
investment needs.5 Other studies give even higher 
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The infrastructure financing gap between what 
is invested in the Asia and Pacific region estimated 
at (around $48 billion) and what is needed ($228 bil-
lion) is around $180 billion every year, according to 
the United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), op. cit. While 
this figure is only indicative, and there are other 
higher estimates, it is clear that the infrastructure 
financing gap in the region is enormous. 
Within this financing gap there is a large de-
mand and need for regional initiatives to take place. 
As pointed out by Agarwala and Kumar (2007), for 
example the region has excellent opportunities for 
cross-border energy infrastructure and surface trans-
port developments. With regard to energy, the Asian 
region has several resource-rich economies that tend 
to have low demand, while adjacent resource poor 
countries have high demand, suggesting interconnec-
tion projects would improve efficiency in the region. 
Further improvements could also result from capital-
izing on the sectoral and seasonal complementarities 
Table 4
ExPEcTED ANNUAl INFRASTRUcTURE INvESTMENT NEEDS, 2005–2010
  New Maintenance  Total
$ million % GDP   $ million % GDP   $ million % GDP
By income group
Low income 49,988 3.2 58,619 3.7 108,607 6.9
Middle income 183,151 2.6 173,035 2.5 356,187 5.1
High income 135,956 0.4 247,970 0.8 383,926 1.2
Developing countries by region
East Asia and Pacific 99,906 3.7 78,986 2.9 178,892 6.6
South Asia 28,069 3.1 35,033 3.8 63,101 6.9
Europe and Central Asia 39,069 2.8 58,849 4.2 97,918 6.9
Middle East and North Africa 14,884 2.4 13,264 2.1 28,148 4.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 13,268 2.8 12,644 2.7 25,912 5.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 37,944 1.6 32,878 1.4 70,822 3.0
All developing countries 233,139 2.7 231,654 2.7 464,793 5.5
World 369,095 0.9 479,624 1.2 848,719 2.1
Source:  Fay and Yepes, 2003.
Note:  GDP deflator used is an average of the 2005–10 projections. 
Table 5
INFRASTRUcTURE INvESTMENT NEEDS  







Energy 74,570 32,730 107,300
Telecommunications 20,425 15,590 36,015
Transportation 31,046 29,649 60,695
Water and sanitation 9,077 15,062 24,139
Total 135,118 93,031 228,149
Source:  UNESCAP, 2006, annex VIII.I. The methodology is 
based on the joint ADB/JBIC/WB (2005) study.11 Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks
that exist for power trading, Surface transport is likely 
to increase in demand as sea lanes will struggle to 
cope with the increasing flows of trade in Asia.
 
2.  Latin America
In recent years, infrastructure investment has 
fallen sharply in most of Latin America. While 
public investment has fallen significantly between 
1996–2001, the increase in private investment failed 
to make up for this drop and overall investment fell 
to only 2.2 per cent of GDP in 1996–2001 from an 
average of 3.7 per cent of GDP in 1980–1985. In-
frastructure in Latin America has considerably fallen 
behind the East Asian developing countries that it 
once trailed and the gap has widened over the past 
20 years. Current spending on infrastructure in the 
region is less than 2 per cent of GDP.6 The state of 
infrastructure in the region is seen as problematic, for 
example about 55 per cent of private sector compa-
nies in Latin America say infrastructure is a problem, 
compared with only about 18 per cent in East Asia.
Fay and Morrison (2005) and also Fay and 
Yepes (2003) conclude that annual spending of 
3 per cent of the region’s GDP, around $71 billion, 
is needed towards new infrastructure investment 
and maintenance, as compared with infrastructure 
spending of 2 per cent of GDP, around $47 billion, 
in 2005. These figures are likely to be lower bound 
estimates.
Furthermore, for the region to reach infrastruc-
ture coverage levels similar to that of China or the 
Republic of Korea, an annual spending of 4 per cent 
to 6 per cent of GDP would be required for the next 
20 years, which means almost tripling the current 
spending. This level of spending on infrastructure 
could lead to additional per capita annual growth rates 
of 1.4 per cent to 1.8 per cent of GDP and decreases 
in inequality by 10 per cent to 20 per cent (Fay and 
Morrison, 2005).
3.  Africa
Infrastructure challenges in Africa are massive. 
Access to infrastructure services is crucial to facili-
tate economic growth and poverty alleviation, since 
many African states are poor low-income countries. 
Poor infrastructure affects health, education, access 
to markets and investment. Efficient infrastructure 
and services is a key to Africa’s integration and de-
velopment. The under provision of infrastructure is 
critical in low-income countries.
As seen in table 4 above, low-income countries 
are the ones with largest infrastructure investment 
needs, around 7 per cent of their GDP annually from 
2005–2010. The expected annual needs for new in-
frastructure and maintenance in sub-Saharan Africa 
region are around 5.5 per cent of the region’s GDP. 
Over the next 10 years, total Africa’s infrastructure 
investment needs are thus estimated at over $250 
billion.
Furthermore, if Africa is to reach the MDGs 
by 2015, it needs average growth rates of over 7 per 
cent for the next 10 years or so which corresponds to 
annual estimated new infrastructure and maintenance 
requirements of about 9 per cent of GDP, or equiva-
lently $40 billion between 2005 and 2015 (Estache 
2006). Table 6 shows how infrastructure investment 
would need to be scaled up in order to achieve growth 
of 5–7 per cent of GDP. 
The infrastructure investment needs in Africa 
far exceed present investment levels (see table 6). 
Public sector finance for infrastructure is severely 
constrained and has been declining over the last 
30 years. The low amount of private domestic and 
foreign investment is influenced by domestic difficul-
ties, high cost of transport and unreliable utilities. 
Table 6
ExPEcTED INFRASTRUcTURE INvESTMENT 
AND MAINTENANcE NEEDS
(Billions of dollars)
Investment needs  Historical
Needed  
to achieve 
5–7 per cent 
growth
Capital Investment (ODA, 
public exp., private sector) 10–12 17–22
Operations and management 
(cost recovery, gov., ODA) 7 17
Source:  World Bank, 2005.12 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 50
III. Priorities for new regional 
institutions or for expansion 
of existing ones
A.  The sectors
1.  Infrastructure
Clearly a very important priority for new re-
gional institutions or for expansion of existing ones 
needs to be infrastructure. As analysed immediately 
above, in Asia and Latin America and Africa there 
are currently vast financing gaps for infrastructure; as 
pointed out, infrastructure is a crucial constraint for 
growth, particularly, but not only, related to trade – 
especially regional. The very valuable role that RDBs 
can play, especially in regional infrastructure, can be 
illustrated by the positive European experience of 
the EIB which channelled vast loans into this sector, 
and gave increasing attention to interconnections of 
infrastructure between countries to support regional 
trade and development. Though on a far more limited 
scale, RDBs and SRDBs have started supporting the 
planning and financing of regional infrastructure both 
in Latin America (via the Initiative for the Integra-
tion of Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA), and the Plan 
Puebla-Panama) and in Asia (where a particularly 
successful regional experience is the Greater Mekong 
sub-region).
These needs – and the role that RDBs and 
SRDBs should play – are reinforced by the fact that 
the high hopes for the private sector to meet infra-
structure needs have largely not been fulfilled. There 
have been some successes of major private invest-
ment – e.g. in telecommunications – but these have 
often been sector and country specific. Secondly, it 
may be important to highlight that part of the new de-
mand for infrastructure arises from structural changes 
in demand. Two important examples are those related 
to rapid urbanisation in most developing countries 
and environmental problems. Where environmental 
issues have a regional or sub-regional character, the 
role of the RDB or SRDBs in planning and financ-
ing investment could be particularly appropriate 
and valuable. Thirdly, there is strong and increasing 
international evidence that infrastructure investment 
is not only clearly central for accelerating growth, 
but also reducing inequality and poverty, thus mak-
ing growth patterns more pro-poor (for a review of 
evidence, see Estache, 2004 and Jones, 2006.) This 
is particularly the case when special efforts are made 
to make the pattern of growth more inclusive, for ex-
ample by larger investments in poorer regions; here, 
the European experience, via the EIB, also offers a 
valuable precedent, as so much emphasis was placed 
on lending for infrastructure projects in the poorer 
areas, initially in the Italian Mezzogiorno, then the 
poorest areas in the European Community. Similarly 
as new countries joined the EU, e.g. Portugal, Greece 
and Spain, again the EIB lent for infrastructure invest-
ment on a large scale. 
Specifically in the case of Asia, there is very 
strong empirical evidence that infrastructure invest-
ment in poorer, and rural areas, as well as feeder roads 
and improved water and sanitation services have 
the greatest positive direct impact on improving the 
incomes of the poor (Fan and Zhang, 2004). 
2.  Social sectors
It is also important to stress that several of 
the above referred studies found that often the ef-
fectiveness of investment in infrastructure was 
complemented by investment in education, agricul-
tural research etc. This would seem to imply that 
investment financed by RDBs and SRDBs should 
not be exclusively focussed on infrastructure, but 
on a broader set of sectors. However, infrastructure 
– given huge financing gaps and its proven impact on 
growth – should be given important priority. 
3.  The productive sector
RDB lending to productive sectors has been 
falling as a percentage of the total RDB portfolio, 
with the sharpest reduction occurring for the Asian 
Development Bank (AsDB) and for IADB. This 
occurred as the public sector in many developing 
countries progressively reduced its direct participa-
tion in productive activities. 
For the productive sector, new opportunities 
and challenges are arising from major structural 
changes in the world economy, linked to the rise and 
dynamism of China and India, as well as other parts 
of Asia. Thus, for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
as well as Africa and parts of Asia itself, there seems 
to be a need to encourage and finance investment and 
technological development that: 
  (i)  Helps countries benefit fully from opportuni-
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investing in inputs, goods and services that these 
countries demand; 
 (ii)  Support increased competitiveness in products, 
where countries have lost it due to competition 
from countries like China; and
  (iii)  Support investment and technological devel-
opment in new economic activities, to replace 
those that are unable to compete with the Asian 
drivers. 
4.  Climate change
Another new challenge is climate change. 
Though limiting climate change is a global public 
good, and therefore encouraging or financing invest-
ment in low carbon technologies may be best done by 
a global institution like the World Bank, important 
tasks remain for RDBs and SRDBs. These relate to 
supporting investment to mitigate and adapt to cli-
mate change, where it will have national or regional 
negative impacts. 
5.  The need for initial focus
Though we have outlined quite a large number 
of sectors with developmentally important unmet 
needs, there may be a strong case, in terms of ef-
ficiency, for RDBs and SRDBs to focus, especially 
initially, on those sectors where the region they serve 
has the highest needs. If borrowing governments will 
have a dominant position, this should facilitate the 
establishment of such initial priorities, according to 
national and regional needs. 
IV.  To what extent can private financial 
markets or existing development 
banks fund developmentally 
necessary projects?
A.  Existing development banks
It is interesting to emphasize that there are very 
large regional differences in the existence of regional 
and sub-regional development banks. For example, 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, there already 
is quite a well developed network of sub-regional 
financial institutions, including three important 
banks which play a significant role in the countries 
they lend to – the already discussed CAF, the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), 
and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). The 
region also has a large regional bank, the IADB, 
whose lending is significantly higher than that of 
the World Bank. Nevertheless important financing 
gaps exist for infrastructure – where investment is 
very low compared to Asia, for the social sectors, 
and also to meet new challenges in the productive 
sector. Therefore, there is a clear need to expand 
existing sub-regional development banks; there is 
also space for creating new ones. One clear gap for 
example in Latin America is that Mercosur does not 
have its own SRDB.
The existence of several SRDBs in Latin 
America is in sharp contrast with Asia, where there 
are no sub-regional development bank, and where a 
large sub-regional financing gap exists, for example 
in infrastructure. There would therefore seem to 
be a very strong case for establishing one or more 
SRDB in Asia, the option of establishing an Asian 
Investment Bank, partly drawing on the EIB experi-
ence seems an attractive option. One cost effective 
option that UNESCAP suggests could be to start with 
a pan-Asian Investment Bank but initially limiting 
its membership. As it gains expertise and overcomes 
initial problems – such as links and boundaries with 
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank it 
could expand both its membership and scope of its 
activities. This is the model followed de facto by the 
CAF, which started as an Andean bank, but is increas-
ingly becoming a Latin American bank. 
B.	 The	limitations	of	private	finance:	
market imperfections
As regards international private finance, it can 
and does play an important role in financing invest-
ment in developing countries. However, it has a 
number of important problematic features and gaps, 
a first major one is the volatility and reversibility of 
private capital flows, which imply that RDBs and 
SRDBs need to play an important role in:
  (i)  Providing counter-cyclical finance when private 
flows dry up; and 
 (ii)  Help develop innovative market instruments 
that better share risks through time between 
developing country borrowers with foreign 
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The catalytic and innovative role by RDBs and 
SRDBs could significantly increase the developmen-
tal benefits, and sharply reduce the development costs 
of private flows initially for middle-income countries 
but, in the future, hopefully also for low income 
countries. It is important, however, to stress here 
that financial innovation, which is developmentally 
desirable, does not necessarily lead to its spontaneous 
adoption by private markets. This is due to problems 
such as initial lack of critical mass and product 
uncertainty, large externalities as well as coordina-
tion problems and competition in financial markets; 
this implies that the private individual incentive to 
develop such an instrument can be far lower than 
the social benefits, both for creditors and for debtors 
(Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). Thus the role which 
RDBs and SRDBs can play as “market makers” for 
such developmentally desirable instruments can be 
especially crucial. 
Several of the problems of international private 
finance arise from financial market imperfections 
that are an obstacle for delivering essential finance 
critical for development and for financing “regional 
public goods”. These include: 
1.  Asymmetries of information
The intertemporal nature of lending leaves it 
open to moral hazard and adverse selection, which 
suggests that too much risk may be undertaken by 
the recipient ex-post the receipt of the loan, and that 
lending may be given to riskier borrowers than de-
sired. Especially in developing countries the lenders 
are short on information for monitoring, whilst the 
borrowers are short on collateral, creating large infor-
mation asymmetries and poor incentives to prevent 
the borrowers from reneging on their loan. This may 
lead to credit rationing, or under-supply of credit for 
good loans to creditworthy borrowers. 
The experience, regional knowledge, credibility, 
credit rating, and localized monitoring capabilities 
of an RDB or SRDB can play an important role in 
overcoming this market imperfection. For example, 
when entering a project with other private banks, the 
RDB or SRDB can undertake the majority of screen-
ing, evaluation and monitoring, rather than have the 
separate private banks undertake their own individual 
evaluations. The RDB or SRDB can carry out a very 
detailed evaluation, going beyond the typical analysis 
of a commercial bank, as well as particularly careful 
monitoring. This saves costs for the private banks 
involved, and acts as a signalling device to attract 
private investment, which is made particularly cred-
ible if the RDB assumes some of the risks, either via 
providing a guarantee or by lending its own money, 
via co-financing. If the RDB or the SRDB has estab-
lished a very high reputation as a careful evaluator 
and lender, as for example the EIB did, the value of 
the signal sent when it finances part of a project is 
very high. Furthermore, if a large part of bank lending 
is carried out with repeat borrowers that especially 
value access to EIB lending, monitoring is easier as 
the risk of moral hazard is lowered. 
2.   Complementarities 
This market imperfection occurs when there 
is a divergence between individual cost and social 
gain, which results from positive or negative ex-
ternalities that are not reflected in the profit of the 
investor or lender. If each individual firm does not 
take into account benefits of growth and they fail 
to co-ordinate, multiple equilibria may arise and a 
lock in a sub-optimum level of investment can occur. 
Complementarities are particularly relevant when 
investing in infrastructure, because the numerous 
external gains for consumers and firms brought about 
from its construction do not accrue to the investor. 
To overcome this market imperfection the exter-
nality needs to be internalized, RDBs and SRDBs can 
play a role by providing social evaluation of the pro-
posed investment, by assisting in the co-ordination 
of investment between several private actor and/or 
by providing subsidized loans when social returns 
are higher than total private returns. 
3.  Market failures or imperfections specifically 
linked to infrastructure
There are also market failures or imperfections 
specifically linked to big infrastructure projects. 
Firstly, and perhaps most important, such projects 
often take a long time to build up revenues and be-
come profitable; these periods are often far longer 
than those for which capital or banking markets want 
to lend for. Financial markets do not wish to commit 
themselves over very long periods, as they seem to 
perceive risk increases over time. 
Furthermore, the length of the maturity, ac-
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infrastructure projects imply political risks. The 
regulatory frameworks are especially complex for 
cross-border projects. 
C.  Problems in providing regional public 
goods (RPGs)
Regional public goods have been relatively 
neglected even despite the fact that much financing 
for development issues, such as regional energy co-
operation, financial regulation to limit cross-border 
contagion or infrastructure coordination, are better 
dealt with at the regional level. RDBs have a central 
role to play in the provision of these RPGs. 
Public goods, regional and international, are 
characterized by generating externalities, by creating 
opportunities for improvement of welfare through 
collective action. A regional public good is a service 
or resource whose benefits are shared by neighbouring 
countries and often requires cross-border collective 
action and coordination, often between different gov-
ernments and private sector actors, which is complex 
to achieve. Because of these features regional public 
goods are usually undersupplied. 
Lending for regional initiatives has been diffi-
cult as borrowers must first agree between themselves 
on their respective debt obligations. Strictly regional 
programmes are relatively rare and many programmes 
are in fact a cluster of country programmes. 
RDBs have the ability to potentially provide 
solutions to the collective action problems at the 
regional level. A particularly good example was the 
EIB, and its commitment to regional infrastructure. 
It is important to clarify that institutions (e.g. RDBs) 
need to have not just the appropriate mandate to 
provide RPGs, but sufficient capital, as well as ap-
propriate instruments to do so. 
There is thus a need to guarantee that strong de-
veloping country regional institutions are developed. 
Institution building is very much affected by political 
considerations since regional integration is in large 
part a political process that is very complex and long 
term in nature, as can be seen from the example of 
history of European cooperation. Wyplosz (2006) 
argues that regional integration may be hindered by 
nationalistic forces as the process of integration is 
associated with the erosion of national sovereignty. 
This points to the fact that political motivations and 
political will need to play a vital role in the regional 
initiatives.
V.  Best modalities for financing to be 
available
A.  The overall framework
The traditional instrument that MDBs, RDBs 
and SRDBs provide is loans, typically of long ma-
turities. To the extent that market imperfections are 
more permanent (or fairly long term), the case for 
more conventional loans from RDBs and SRDBs 
remains very strong. Clear examples of missing or 
incomplete markets are those of loans to poorer, less 
creditworthy countries and loans where long maturity 
is required for activities to become profitable, such as 
in the case of much infrastructure. However, where 
market failures are more temporary, there may be 
an important case for RDBs and SRDBs helping 
introduce more innovative instrument. Indeed, in 
some cases, leadership in first time transactions can 
be crucial for creating the confidence and conditions 
for subsequent transactions. 
B.  Loans
1.  Standard loans and their maturities
Clearly where more permanent market gaps or 
imperfections exist, there is space for more conven-
tional loans. As pointed out, it is particularly difficult 
– even for creditworthy borrowers – to obtain credits 
with long maturities. Therefore, long maturities for 
loans by RDBs are very important, especially, but 
not only, in areas such as infrastructure; a variant 
on this is for the development bank to lend for the 
longer maturities, whilst private lenders and inves-
tors provide more short-term resources. The ability 
of RDBs and SRDBs to provide such long term 
loans is of course to an important extent linked to 
their ability to obtain long term funding in private 
capital markets. This could therefore be an important 
consideration in defining the size, composition and 
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2.  Local currency lending 
A crucial role that multilateral and regional 
development banks need to play is to mitigate the pro-
cyclical effects of financial markets, which can have 
such damaging effects for developing countries. One 
important way in which RDBs and SRDBs can do this 
is by helping create or kick-start market instruments 
that better distribute the risk faced by developing 
countries throughout the business cycle, such as lo-
cal currency and GDP-linked bonds (Ocampo and 
Griffith-Jones, 2006). RDBs and SRDBs can and 
should increasingly do so by acting as “market mak-
ers” for such instruments. 
One very crucial problem of cross-border 
lending has been that of currency mismatching for 
projects or companies that borrow in foreign cur-
rency and have revenues in local currency; this was 
an extremely important cause of debt and currency 
crises, as well as causing major disruptions (and 
even bankruptcies) to companies and projects. The 
most direct and desirable modality for dealing with 
foreign exchange risk is promoting local currency 
funding. The issue of local currency bonds has led 
to their fairly significant growth domestically in 
some developing countries; international investors 
have also become increasingly interested, though to 
a lesser extent. Where such financing is not available 
(or is too expensive or too short-term), MDBs or 
RDBs can help develop such a market.
This creates a more stable source of local fund-
ing for both the private and public sectors thereby 
mitigating the problems of sudden stops in private 
international capital flows. 
3.  GDP-linked bonds 
Besides issuing and developing further instru-
ments already in existence, such as local currency 
lending, RDBs and SRDBs could go beyond and 
pioneer new instruments. This should be done where 
there is a growing consensus that such instruments 
can play an important role in supporting develop-
ment. One such example seems to be GDP-linked 
bonds. The servicing of these GDP-linked bonds 
would be higher in times of rapid growth and lower 
when growth was slow or negative. 
For borrowers, issuing such bonds would help 
stabilise public spending throughout the cycle as 
governments would service more debt when they 
could better afford to, and less in more difficult times. 
It would also significantly reduce the likelihood of 
costly and disruptive defaults and debt crises. A 
temporary reduction of a country’s debt service when 
the economy deteriorates would facilitate more rapid 
recovery. This would open space for higher govern-
ment spending in bad times, thus reducing the need 
for damaging cuts in social spending. On the other 
hand, in boom times, higher servicing of debt by 
governments would curb excessively expansionary 
fiscal policy.
For investors, defaults are costly as they result 
in expensive renegotiation and sometimes in very 
large losses. As GDP-linked bonds would help 
reduce the probability of default, effective total pay-
ments may in fact be higher than with conventional 
bonds. Furthermore, GDP-linked bonds would give 
investors the opportunity of taking a position on a 
range of countries’ growth rates, offering a valuable 
diversification opportunity (see Griffith-Jones and 
Shiller, 2006).
The moment is particularly favourable. Though 
current financial turbulence may pose a problem, 
investor appetite for emerging countries’ risk is still 
fairly strong. Investors’ experience with Argentine 
GDP warrants, issued as part of their debt restruc-
turing, has been very positive; their price has been 
rising significantly. However, markets and issuers 
may be slow to move forward on their own to de-
velop GDP-linked bonds, due to externalities and 
collective action problems, as well as initial lack of 
liquidity of such instruments. Any country whose 
growth slows significantly, for example as a result 
of current problems in developed countries, would 
be thankful afterwards that they have the insurance 
such bonds represent. 
C.  An important role for guarantees: the 
nature of desirable instruments
It seems desirable for the RDBs/SRDBs to be 
involved in risk mitigation activity, for example, 
by providing guarantees. Guarantees can be, where 
appropriate, a vital mechanism to ensure that pri-
vate financing becomes available (in areas such as 
infrastructure project finance and loans to SMEs) 
which would otherwise not be feasible due to credit 
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resources, by catalyzing private flows. They have 
become fairly important as an MDB/RDB instrument; 
in recent years, guarantees are estimated to have been 
equivalent to almost 10 per cent of IFI combined 
programmes (Winpenny, 2005). They could however, 
be expanded and tailored more closely to developing 
countries’ needs. 
In deciding and designing guarantees it is im-
portant that these are tailor made to existing market 
or government imperfections, to avoid two distor-
tions:
  (i)  Ensure that private investors choose good 
projects and run them efficiently thus avoiding 
adverse selection. Excessive guarantees could 
provide incentives for potentially more profit-
able projects, with very high risk of failure. 
Furthermore, the design of the guarantee needs 
to encourage the investor to maximize its suc-
cess.
 (ii)  It is necessary for guarantees to avoid excessive 
contingency liabilities both for international 
institutions and host governments (see Grif-
fith-Jones and Fuzzo de Lima (2005) which 
discusses the issues of guarantees in greater 
depth).
It would seem that the type of risk which devel-
opment banks would be best qualified to guarantee 
against – given their experience and links with gov-
ernments – is regulatory and contractual risk. The 
second type of risk that can be covered by guarantees 
is credit risk. To avoid moral hazard, it is important 
that such guarantees are partial and clearly defined. 
The third type of risk that private investors and lend-
ers are understandably very keen to get guarantees 
on is devaluation risk, especially after so many major 
debt and currency crises in the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
However, open-ended public guarantees against de-
valuation can impose excessive contingent liabilities 
on RDBs and SRDBs and indeed on host govern-
ments (where counter-guarantees are required). 
It is important that guarantees should be tailor-
made to correct market imperfections and avoid 
moral hazard, as well as avoid excessive contingent 
public liabilities. In the case of infrastructure projects, 
the risks to be guaranteed have to be carefully defined 
so that private agents assume normal market risks 
(which can be subject, however, to some countercy-
clical evaluation), whereas non-market risks (such as 
regulatory risk or force majeure) should be subject 
to greater attention by RDBs. 
vI. Structure of regional banks to 
reduce their cost of lending and 
increase access for poorer countries
There are several conditions for regional banks 
to be able to lend at low cost. These are well illus-
trated by the experience of the EIB. A first condition 
is to make an RDB or SRDB as strong financially 
as possible, by endowing it with a large capital base. 
This not only reduces the cost of funding from the 
capital markets, which benefits borrowers by allow-
ing lending at low cost; it also reduces the likelihood 
of recourse to shareholder money. 
It is important to emphasize that whilst initial 
contributions by member countries can imply a fairly 
large commitment of resources towards capital, as the 
bank expands its lending, and if it charges mark-up, 
on its total costs, it will generate surpluses. As such 
banks typically pay no dividends; an important use 
of surpluses is to finance future increases of capital. 
For example, since 1991, all capital increases of the 
EIB were self-financed from earnings (see Griffith-
Jones, et al, 2006) As so many developing countries 
now have large foreign exchange reserves, exceed-
ing their liquidity needs, this would seem to be an 
excellent time to allocate a fairly small part of those 
reserves to both expand RDBs or SRDBs and create 
new ones (see section VII below). 
It is noteworthy that, with respect to contribu-
tions to paid-in capital, pecunia non olet (“money 
does not smell”); this means that paid-in capital con-
tributions from countries with lower ratings would 
not be affected by a discount factor. Indeed as the 
experience of the CAF shows it may be necessary 
for banks with only developing country members to 
have a fairly high share of paid in capital, to ensure 
a very good rating for the RDB or SRDB. 
Other conditions for a high rating and thus 
low cost are also extremely important. They include 
strong management, a good loan portfolio based on 
rigorous economic evaluation of projects and low 
delinquency of loans. It should be stressed that the 
perceived reputation and creditworthiness of such an 
institution may take some time to become established. 
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a relatively small, first class professional staff helps 
the bank establish a very good reputation as has been 
the case for both the EIB and the CAF. If feasible, it 
would seem best if the staff of the bank was chosen 
only on professional merit; for example, the CAF 
prides itself on not using country quota criteria for 
appointing its staff. 
It also seems desirable that the staff employed 
in the RDB or SRDB is relatively small in proportion 
to loans made, as this will limit administrative costs, 
which need to be added to the cost of loans. This will 
be facilitated by the fact that there will be no intricate 
conditionality, often time-consuming and complex to 
negotiate, as can be the case with MDBs. On the other 
hand, it is important to have sufficient high quality 
staff to carry out rigorous evaluation of projects, and 
provide technical assistance where required. 
RDBs and SRDBs can also subsidize loans to 
relatively poorer countries and for projects to improve 
incomes of poor people. The CAF has an interest-
ing mechanism, called the Compensatory Financial 
Mechanism, whereby parts of its surpluses are devot-
ed to subsidizing loans to: (a) countries with a lower 
level of development, (b) social sector projects that 
especially favour poor people, and (c) high priority 
regional infrastructure. There is a matrix of rankings 
for levels of subsidy, with the highest subsidies going 
for example to loans for social projects in the poorest 
countries of the region. 
Naturally, resources available from CAF earn-
ings are limited, and they are used to help finance 
capital increases, to fund grants for technical assist-
ance as well as for the above discussed subsidies. It 
may therefore be desirable that countries which are 
relatively more developed, or have greater levels of 
foreign exchange reserves, beyond their liquidity 
needs, contribute additional resources to enlarge this 
fund. More generally, when new RDBs or SRDBs 
are created, provision should be made for an ele-
ment of solidarity whereby concessional resources 
are provided by richer countries for subsidizing high 
priority loans to poorer countries. 
vII. Do developing countries have 
sufficient resources for expanding 
RDBs or creating new ones?
We have argued above that there can be a sig-
nificant expansion of lending by existing regional 
development banks or by new ones, which are owned 
by developing countries. This is due to the large 
pool of foreign exchange reserves which developing 
countries have acquired, that extend clearly beyond 
their immediate liquidity needs, as reflected in the 
increased creation and large scale of sovereign wealth 
funds.
We will provide here some very preliminary 
calculations, which show the feasibility of a signifi-
cant expansion of developing country owned RDBs 
funded by a very small proportion of total developing 
countries’ foreign exchange reserves. We will assume 
that the ratio between paid-in capital and level of 
annual loans would be approximately 2.4, similar to 
the ratio of CAF.7 This is a conservative estimate to 
take account of relatively lower ratings of developing 
countries than those of developed countries. It is thus 
far lower than the same ratio for the EIB, as that bank 
has just developed country members.
We will assume that developing countries have 
currently around $3.2 trillion in foreign exchange re-
serves, (IMF, 2007), and that a very small proportion, 
only 1 per cent, of these reserves, equal to $32 billion, 
are allocated to paid-in capital for expansion or crea-
tion of developing country RDBs. Though authorized 
capital would be higher, it is only paid-in capital, 
that would require money placed into expansion or 
creation of RDBs. If the same conservative ratio of 
authorized capital to paid-in capital was used as that 
of the CAF (2.8), around $90 billion would need to 
be provided as authorized capital, but only $32 billion 
of paid-in capital (money actually put in). With this 
amount of paid-in capital (and assuming the same 
ratio of annual loans to paid-in capital as the CAF), 
the expanded RDBs or new ones could provide an ad-
ditional annual lending of approximately $77 billion. 
This would imply the ability to finance an important 
proportion of unmet needs for infrastructure finance 
and other development needs.
On the basis of these calculations, (which are 
very preliminary), the additional annual lending ca-
pacity created – of over $70 billion – would be very 
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Bank – at around $6 billion annually, the IADB at 
around $7 billion, the AsDB at around $7.5 billion 
annually and the AfDB at around $3.3 billion annu-
ally; indeed the additional lending capacity of this 
developing countries’ bank/s would be larger (and 
more than double) than the total current annual lend-
ing of these four major institutions put together!
Clearly far more detailed calculations need to be 
made, as well as discussions held with governments, 
rating agencies and others to establish requirements 
for a well rated development bank. One factor to 
consider would be that new development bank/s 
may require, for example, a higher capital/loans 
than calculated above because they do not have 
accumulated retained earnings, which complement 
the capital available in institutions like the CAF or 
other existing development banks; existing banks 
can leverage their retained earnings as well as their 
paid-in capital. Indeed, with time, development 
banks’ retained earnings can become far higher than 
the paid-in capital, (for the World Bank they are more 
than double), which would allow future increases 
in lending, without additional paid-in capital. By 
creating or expanding RDBs now (at a time when 
they have very large foreign exchange reserves), 
developing countries would create their own present 
and future lending capacity, even if in the future 
they cannot or do not wish to expand paid-in capital 
further. That is why the time is now for developing 
countries to create or expand their own regional or 
sub-regional banks.
vIII. The need for new RDBs and for 
expanding existing ones 
There is a clear case for both creating develop-
ing country owned new RDBs and SRDBs, as well 
as expanding existing institutions. The availability 
of large foreign exchange reserves, beyond their 
liquidity needs, makes it feasible for developing 
countries, especially in Asia and Latin America to be 
able to finance both, where this is the most efficient 
arrangement.
The magnitude of the financing gaps, in Asia, 
Latin America and Africa suggest that the shortfall 
is unlikely to be met only by an increase in lending 
by existing institutions or by private finance. Fur-
thermore, existing regional institutions have found it 
particularly difficult to commit a significant propor-
tion of their lending to regional public goods, and 
have tended to diminish their focus on infrastructure. 
There is a need for developing country owned banks 
to fill this and other gaps. 
The benefits of new and/or expanded Southern 
owned development banks are very clear. These 
institutions could avoid excessive and sometimes in-
appropriate conditionality, thus enhancing ownership 
of development policy within developing country 
regions and countries. They could provide funds in 
an agile way whilst reflecting priorities of developing 
country governments. CAF provides a clear success 
story of such benefits.
Furthermore, new and/or expanded Southern 
regional institutions have clear advantages for 
providing essential funding for supporting regional 
integration – by helping finance for example regional 
infrastructure. The EIB illustrates the advantages of 
trade integration being complemented by significant 
regional investment in infrastructure. 
As discussed in section VII, the resources are 
available in developing countries, with only a very 
small proportion of developing countries’ total for-
eign exchange reserves, a very significant expansion 
of Southern regional and sub-regional development 
bank lending capacity could be created. This would 
require clear political commitment by developing 
country governments – and especially of those who 
would contribute the largest part of resources. The 
EIB offers a clear and successful precedent for such 
strong political commitment.
Expanding existing well functioning Southern 
institutions in their area of comparative expertise is 
clearly desirable. If their capital base is expanded, 
existing institutions can build on their expertise, 
their established links and knowledge of borrowers, 
and their credibility in financial markets; this record 
has taken many years to build up and is a valuable 
asset that needs to be fully used. This is in contrast 
with new institutions, which typically have to build 
up expertise and credibility, both with financial 
markets and borrowers. Furthermore, the leverage of 
paid-capital to loans will be somewhat higher due to 
existing accumulated earnings from previous years. 
Furthermore, the initial expansion of loans of new 
RDBs has been slow and gradual, as they “learn by 
doing”; this is the experience in Europe – both for 
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Once these institutions became well established and 
experienced, they have entered a second phase of 
more rapid growth of loans, expansion of sectors 
and countries lent to, as well as more innovative 
instruments. 
However it also seems desirable to create some 
new institutions, especially to provide regional public 
goods which are currently underprovided, such as re-
gional infrastructure, and to help meet new challenges 
in the productive sector, posed by major structural 
changes in the world economy. 
The European experience can provide inter-
esting lessons in that an institution (the EIB) was 
created with a clear mandate and instruments for 
supporting European integration. When conditions 
changed, and new challenges arose (e.g. create guar-
antees for private finance in infrastructure and for 
SMEs) that it could not easily meet, it helped create 
a new institution the European Investment Fund. 
Another European example was the creation of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD). The Bank was established in 1991 to assist 
the countries of central and Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States in their transi-
tion to the market. With the fall of communism, new 
needs and challenges appeared. EBRD’s priority was 
to promote the development of the private sector, 
allocating to it at least 60 per cent of its financial as-
sistance. One of the EBRD’s main advantages is soon 
to be its willingness to bear risk, allowing it to operate 
at the forefront of commercial possibilities. 
New RDBs or SRDBs, for example focussed 
on regional infrastructure could develop specific 
methodologies for evaluating economic feasibility 
of regional projects, create instruments appropriate 
for lending/guaranteeing cross-border projects, help 
distribute costs and benefits between countries when 
there are asymmetric (see, for example, proposal 
above) and provide technical assistance where this is 
appropriate for overcoming complexities involving 
different countries and stakeholders. 
In the case of Asia, there is a clear lack of sub-
regional development banks, with the AsDB being 
the only – if major, effective and well established – 
regional bank. Interesting lessons can be drawn here 
from the very successful and rapidly growing CAF. 
Because of the diversity of Asian countries 
and, especially, the huge distances between differ-
ent regions and countries, it may be desirable to 
create several SRDBs, for example, a South Asian, 
North East Asian and South East Asian SRDB. This 
would have the advantage of sub-regional focus, 
and of giving smaller countries participation in their 
governance. To avoid lack of coordination between 
sub-regions, another option would be to start with 
a new pan-Asian infrastructure bank, but initially 
limiting its membership (UNESCAP, 2006). As it 
would become more established, it could expand 
its membership. Such a bank, that could be called 
the Asian Investment Bank, could initially focus on 
integrating pan-Asian infrastructure. It would natu-
rally work closely with the AsDB to benefit from its 
considerable expertise in this field. 
In the case of Latin America, there already exists 
an important network of SRDBs, which are major 
lenders to countries in their sub-regions. There seems 
to be a strong case to expand existing institutions; 
this seems particularly clear for the CAF, which has 
had such an excellent performance. This is also im-
portant because creating a new institution will take 
some time and expanding its loans will probably 
take some time. 
However, important gaps remain. For example, 
Mercosur does not have a sub-regional development 
bank to help finance integrated infrastructure and 
lend – with some possible concessional elements – to 
poorer countries and regions. There are new produc-
tive and environmental needs. And the challenge to 
reduce poverty, especially by generating employ-
ment, continues to be a pressing issue in the region. 
Therefore, the likely creation of the Banco Sur, can 
provide valuable additional resources to meet the 
region’s needs. Its lending should be more focussed 
on areas where existing institutions have been less 
active. It would be important also for the Banco Sur 
to learn, where relevant, from the successful experi-
ence of institutions like the CAF in determining its 
criteria for lending, capitalization, and governance 
arrangements. 
Two final points need to be made. Though it is 
very valuable to create new institutions, where clear 
gaps exist, it is important to avoid too much duplica-
tion of services, and to limit the transaction costs that 
establishing new institutions imply. 
Creating new institutions or expanding existing 
ones – if developing countries are the only or main 
members – will have very clear benefits; the most 21 Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks
important one is increasing their voice in the alloca-
tion of resources, especially those that originate from 
their own national savings and their own very large 
foreign exchange reserves. This is an important and 
unique opportunity that developing countries need 
to take now!
Notes
  1  In English it is called the Andean Development Corpora-
tion (ADC); we will use CAF, which is widely utilized.
  2  It should be stressed that in Europe the richer countries – 
and specifically, Germany – were willing to transfer major 
grants to the poorer countries on a significant scale, given 
their commitment to a broader project of European integra-
tion (for more details, see Griffith-Jones, et al., 2006).
  3  It is noteworthy that both the other two SRDBs in the 
region, the Caribbean Development Bank and the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration, also have much 
higher investment ratings than their member countries. 
  4  The required needs for new investment and maintenance 
within telecommunications sector is $30.8 billion for 
main lines and $5.2 billion for mobile, within transport 
$56.4 billion is needed for paved roads and $4.3 billion 
for railroads and the required investment for water is 
$13 billion and $11 billion for sanitation.
  5  These estimates do not include resources for rehabilitation 
(making up for deferred past maintenance) or upgrading. 
Furthermore only limited number of areas is included and 
some infrastructure sectors that have grown significantly 
in recent years are omitted, such as oil, city and urban 
infrastructure and ICT.
  6  The only exceptions are Colombia (4 per cent) and Chile 
(6 per cent) who have experienced significant increase in 
their investment since 1996 (Fay and Morrison, 2005). 
  7  Calculations for the latter based on the level of annual loans 
of the CAF in 2006 of $4.3 billion whilst paid-in capital 
was $1.8 billion (CAF, 2006; Sagasti and Prada, op. cit.)
Bibliography
ADB/JBIC/WB (2005). Connecting East Asia: A New Frame-
work for Infrastructure. Joint study, Asian Development 
Bank, Japan Bank for International Cooperation/World 
Bank.
Agarwala R and Kumar N (2007). Regional Cooperation for 
Infrastructure Development in Asia. RIS report. New 
Delhi. 
Birdsall N (2006). Overcoming Coordination and Attribution 
Problems: Meeting the Challenge of Underfunded Region-
alism. In: Kaul I and Conceicao P. eds. The New Public 
Finance: Responding to Global Challenges. New York, 
Oxford University Press.
Birdsall N and Rojas-Suarez L (2004). Financing Development: 
The Power of Regionalism. Washington DC, Center for 
Global Development. 
Borensztein E and Mauro P (2004). The Case for GDP-indexed 
Bonds. Economic Policy, 19(38): 165–216.
CAF (2006). Annual Report 2006. Corporación Andina de Fo-
mento, Caracas, Venezuela. 
CAF (2007). Inversión y productividad. Presentation by Miguel 
Castilla. Corporación Andina de Fomento. Caracas, Ven-
ezuela.
Culpeper R (2006). Reforming the Global Financial Architecture. 
The Potential of Regional Institutions. In: Ocampo JA, ed. 
Regional Financial Cooperation. Baltimore, MD, Brook-
ings Institution Press.
Estache A (2004). Emerging Infrastructure Policy Issues in 
Developing Countries. A Survey of the Recent Economic 
Literature. Background paper for the October 2004 Berlin 
meeting of the POVNET Infrastructure Working Group. 
Washington, DC, World Bank.
Estache A (2006). Africa’s infrastructure: challenges and op-
portunities. Paper presented at the High-level Seminar 
organized by the IMF Institute and the Joint Africa Insti-
tute, Realizing the Potential for Profitable Investment in 
Africa. Tunis, Tunisia. 28 February–1 March.
Fan S and Zhang X (2004). Infrastructure and Regional Eco-
nomic Development in Rural China. China Economic 
Review, 15(2).
Fay M and Morrison M (2005). Infrastructure in Latin America: 
Recent developments and key challenges. Joint study, 
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. 
Washington DC, WB and IADB. 3 June. 
Fay M and Yepes T (2003). Investing in Infrastructure: What is 
Needed From 2000 to 2010? World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3102. Washington, DC, World Bank. 
July.
Fitch Ratings (2006). Ratings of CAF, www.fitchratings.com. 
Griffith-Jones S and Fuzzo de Lima A T (2006). Mitigating the 
Risks of Investing in Developing Countries: Currency-
Related Guarantee Instruments for Infrastructure Projects. 
In: Kaul I and Conceicao P, eds. The New Public Finance: 
Responding to Global Challenges. New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
Griffith-Jones S and Ocampo JA (2002). What Progress on Inter-
national Financial Reform? Why So Limited? Paper pre-
pared for the Expert Group on Development Issues (EGDI). 
Stockholm, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden.
Griffith-Jones S and Shiller R (2006). A bond that insures against 
instability. Financial Times. 10 July. http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/2/b7155454-1039-11db-8f6f-0000779e2340.html.
Griffith-Jones S, Steinherr A and Fuzzo de Lima A T (2006). 
European Financial Institutions: A Useful Inspiration 
for Developing Countries? In: Ocampo JA, ed. Regional 
Financial Cooperation. Baltimore, MD, Brookings In-
stitution Press. 
Gurria JA and Volcker P (2001). The Role of the Multilateral 
Development Banks in Emerging Market Economies. 
Findings of the Commission on the Role of the MDBs in 
Emerging Markets. http://www.thedialogue.org/publica-
tions/MDB_report.pdf.
IMF (2007). World Economic Outlook. September.
Institute of Development Studies (2000). A Foresight and Policy 
Study of the Multilateral Development Banks. Prepared for 
the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Stockholm. 
Jones S (2006). Infrastructure Challenges in South and East Asia. 
IDS Bulletin, Asia 2015: Sustaining Growth and Ending 
Poverty, 37(3).
Ocampo JA (2006). Regional Financial Cooperation: Experiences 
and Challenges. In: Ocampo JA, ed. Regional Financial Co-
operation. Baltimore, MD, Brookings Institution Press.22 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 50
Ocampo JA and Griffith-Jones S (2006). A Countercyclical 
Framework for a development-friendly international finan-
cial architecture. Prepared for the CEDES/IDRC Project on 
“International Financial Architecture, Macro Volatility and 
Institutions: The Developing Country Experience”.
Sagasti F and Prada F (2006). Regional Development Banks: A 
Comparative Perspective. In: Ocampo JA, ed. Regional 
Financial Cooperation. Baltimore, MD, Brookings In-
stitution Press. 
Strand J (2003). Measuring Voting Power in an International 
Institution: The United States and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Economic Governance, 4(1).
Titelman D (2006). Subregional Financial Cooperation: The Ex-
periences of Latin America and the Caribbean. In: Ocampo 
JA, ed. Regional Financial Cooperation. Baltimore, MD, 
Brookings Institution Press. 
UNECA (2006). Infrastructure Development and Regional 
Integration. Paper prepared for ADB/ECA High Level 
Seminar. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. 16 May.
UNESCAP (2006). Enhancing Regional Cooperation in Infrastruc-
ture Development Including that Related to Disaster Manage-
ment. The 62nd Commission Theme Study. New York. 
Yepes T (2004). Expenditure on Infrastructure in East Asia Re-
gion, 2006-2010. Paper commissioned for the ADB/JBIC/
WB East Asia Pacific Infrastructure Flagship Study.
Winpenny J (2005). Guaranteeing Development? The Impact of 
Financial Guarantees. OECD Publications. Paris, OECD, 
Development Centre Studies. 
World Bank (2005). Scaling up infrastructure support in Africa 
and promoting regional integration. Presentation to Mr. 
Wolfowitz in preparation for the Gleneagles summit. 
Washington, DC.
World Bank (2006). Consultation with DAC on Middle-Income 
Countries (MICs). Paris. 14 June. 
Wyplosz C (2006). Regional Exchange Rate Arrangements: 
The European Experience. In: Ocampo JA, ed. Regional 
Financial Cooperation. Baltimore, MD, Brookings In-
stitution Press. 23 Enhancing the Role of Regional Development Banks
No. 49  December 2007  David WOODWARD  IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options
No. 48  November 2007  Sam LAIRD  Aid for Trade: Cool Aid or Kool-Aid
No. 47  October 2007  Jan KREGEL  IMF Contingency Financing for Middle-Income Countries 
with Access to Private Capital Markets: An Assessment of 
the Proposal to Create a Reserve Augmentation Line
No. 46  September 2007  José María FANELLI  Regional Arrangements to Support Growth and Macro-
Policy Coordination in MERCOSUR
No. 45  April 2007  Sheila PAGE  The Potential Impact of the Aid for Trade Initiative
No. 44  March 2007  Injoo SOHN  East Asia’s Counterweight Strategy: Asian Financial 
Cooperation and Evolving International Monetary Order
No. 43  February 2007  Devesh KAPUR and  Beyond the IMF
      Richard WEBB 
No. 42  November 2006  Mushtaq H. KHAN   Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Developing 
Countries: Policies, Evidence and Ways Forward 
No. 41  October 2006  Fernando LORENZO   IMF Policies for Financial Crises Prevention in
      and Nelson NOYA    Emerging Markets
No. 40  May 2006  Lucio SIMPSON  The Role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings: Lending Into 
Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainability Concerns
No. 39  February 2006  Ricardo GOTTSCHALK   East Asia’s Growing Demand for Primary Commodities
      and Daniela PRATES  – Macroeconomic Challenges for Latin America
No. 38  November 2005  Yilmaz AKYüZ  Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board
No. 37  April 2005  Colin I. BRADFORD, Jr.  Prioritizing Economic Growth: Enhancing  
Macro  economic Policy Choice
No. 36  March 2005  JOMO K.S.  Malaysia’s September 1998 Controls: Background, Context, 
Impacts, Comparisons, Implications, Lessons
No. 35  January 2005  Omotunde E.G. JOHNSON  Country Ownership of Reform Programmes and the  
Implications for Conditionality 
No. 34  January 2005  Randall DODD and   Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial
       Shari SPIEGEL  Salvation
No. 33  November 2004  Ilene GRABEL  Trip Wires and Speed Bumps:  Managing Financial 
Risks and Reducing the Potential for Financial Crises in 
Developing Economies
No. 32  October 2004  Jan KREGEL  External Financing for Development and International 
Financial Instability 
No. 31  October 2004  Tim KESSLER and  Assessing the Risks in the Private Provision of 
      Nancy ALEXANDER  Essential Services
No. 30  June 2004  Andrew CORNFORD  Enron and Internationally Agreed Principles for Corpo-
rate Governance and the Financial Sector
No. 29  April 2004  Devesh KAPUR  Remittances: The  New Development Mantra? 
No. 28  April 2004  Sanjaya LALL  Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Govern-
ment Policy in Building Industrial Competitiveness 
No. 27  March 2004  Gerald EPSTEIN,   Capital Management Techniques in Developing 
      Ilene GRABEL   Countries: An Assessment of Experiences from the
      and JOMO, K.S.  1990s and Lessons for the Future
No. 26  March 2004  Claudio M. LOSER  External Debt Sustainability: Guidelines for Low- and 
Middle-income Countries
No. 25  January 2004  Irfan ul HAQUE  Commodities under Neoliberalism: The Case of Cocoa
/...
G-24 Discussion Paper Series*
Research papers for the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development24 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 50
*  G-24 Discussion Paper Series are available on the website at: www.unctad.org. Copies of G-24 Discussion Paper Series may 
be obtained from the Publications Assistant, Macroeconomic and Development Policies Branch, Division on Globalization and De-
velopment Strategies, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, 
Switzerland; Fax (+41-22) 917.0274.
No. 24  December 2003  Aziz Ali MOHAMMED  Burden Sharing at the IMF 
No. 23  November 2003  Mari PANGESTU   The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and 
Implications for other Developing Countries
No. 22  August 2003  Ariel BUIRA  An Analysis of IMF Conditionality
No. 21  April 2003  Jim LEVINSOHN  The World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Ap-
proach: Good Marketing or Good Policy?
No. 20  February 2003  Devesh KAPUR  Do As I Say Not As I Do: A Critique of G-7 Proposals 
on Reforming the Multilateral Development Banks
No. 19   December 2002  Ravi KANBUR  International Financial Institutions and International  
Public Goods: Operational Implications for the World  
Bank 
No. 18  September 2002  Ajit SINGH  Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging   
Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions
No. 17  April 2002  F. LóPEZ-DE-SILANES  The Politics of Legal Reform 
No. 16  January 2002  Gerardo ESQUIVEL and  The Impact of G-3 Exchange Rate Volatility on 
      Felipe LARRAíN B.  Developing Countries
No. 15  December 2001  Peter EVANS and   Organizational Reform and the Expansion  
      Martha FINNEMORE  of the South’s Voice at the Fund
No. 14  September 2001  Charles WYPLOSZ  How Risky is Financial Liberalization in the  
Developing Countries? 
No. 13  July 2001  José Antonio OCAMPO  Recasting the International Financial Agenda 
No.  12  July 2001  Yung Chul PARK and   Reform of the International Financial System and
      Yunjong WANG  Institutions in Light of the Asian Financial Crisis
No. 11  April 2001  Aziz Ali MOHAMMED  The Future Role of the International Monetary Fund
No. 10  March 2001  JOMO K.S.  Growth After the Asian Crisis: What Remains of the East 
Asian Model?
No.  9  February 2001  Gordon H. HANSON  Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?
No.  8  January 2001  Ilan GOLDFAJN and  Can Flexible Exchange Rates Still “Work” in 
      Gino OLIVARES  Financially Open Economies?
No.  7  December 2000  Andrew CORNFORD  Commentary on the Financial Stability Forum’s Report of 
the Working Group on Capital Flows
No.  6  August 2000  Devesh KAPUR and  Governance-related Conditionalities of the International 
      Richard WEBB  Financial Institutions
No.  5  June 2000  Andrés VELASCO  Exchange-rate Policies for Developing Countries: What 
Have We Learned?  What Do We Still Not Know?
No.  4  June 2000  Katharina PISTOR  The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing 
Economies
No.  3  May 2000  Andrew CORNFORD  The Basle Committee’s Proposals for Revised Capital 
Standards: Rationale, Design and Possible Incidence
No.  2  May 2000  T. Ademola OYEJIDE  Interests and Options of Developing and Least-devel-
oped Countries in a New Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations
No.  1  March 2000  Arvind PANAGARIYA  The Millennium Round and Developing Countries:  
Negotiating Strategies and Areas of Benefits  
G-24 Discussion Paper Series*
Research papers for the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development